Satanology and Demonology in the Apostolic Fathers: A Response to Jonathan Burke

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INTRODUCTION

A study by Jonathan Burke infers the existence of a “minority report” within early Christian literature of “texts without references to supernatural evil.” More specifically, he avers that certain texts among the Apostolic Fathers corpus exhibit a significant marginalization of Satan and demons, and that the cause of this is an etiology of evil which is anthropogenic rather than supernatural.

This in turn constitutes evidence “for a first century demythological Christianity which survived well into the second century though only as a minority report.” An “efficient explanation” for this “marginalization” and “demythologization” is “non-belief in Satan and demons” on the part of the authors. Burke thus offers a radical reappraisal of Christian ideas about evil in the early post-apostolic period.

The Apostolic Fathers texts Burke marshals in support of his thesis are Didache, 1 Clement, 2 Clement, the earliest portions of Shepherd of Hermas (Vision 1–4) and Martyrdom of Polycarp. He further claims

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that the *Apology of Quadratus* and the *Epistle to Diognetus* complement his findings.\(^5\) Texts that present “clear evidence of strong mythological belief” with a “Satanic etiology of evil” are limited to Barnabas and the letters of Ignatius,\(^6\) while the later portions of Shepherd of Hermas (Vision 5, Mandate, Similitude) reflect a “weak mythological view.”\(^7\) Polycarp’s *To the Philippians* and the fragments of Papias are not discussed (disappointingly, since they contain some relevant material).

This article interacts critically with Burke’s study, arguing that his conclusions are invalidated by significant methodological and exegetical shortcomings. A detailed alternative synthesis on satanology and demonology in the Apostolic Fathers is not offered herein,\(^8\) but the fundamental counterclaim is that all of the Apostolic Fathers texts are consistent with their authors having believed in mythological evil. Granted, the frequency and intensity of references to mythological evil vary. Perhaps Burke is right that such diversity demands an explanation.\(^9\) However, Burke has both exaggerated the diversity (by understating the concern with supernatural evil beings in several Apostolic Fathers texts) and over-explained it (since diverse content should be expected in occasional writings penned by different authors to different audiences for different purposes).

An online supplement contains additional material that space did not allow to be included herein.\(^10\) Texts and translations of the Apostolic Fathers herein are, unless otherwise indicated, those of Bart D. Ehrman.\(^11\)

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\(^7\) Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 149.


\(^10\) See https://osf.io/5x2ge. References to “online supplement” refer to this material.

AN ASSESSMENT OF BURKE’S METHODOLOGY

Literary Scope

One might quibble with Burke’s decision to analyse only the Apostolic Fathers—“a rather arbitrary collection of writings made for the sake of convenience and based on (modern) tradition”\(^\text{12}\)—in a religion-historical study. Surely, characterising Christianity in the late first century through mid-second century requires attention to other writings (e.g., Ascension of Isaiah, Apocalypse of Peter, Justin’s writings, and several canonical texts). Still, Burke’s argument—if successful—would at least establish the existence of the “demythological Christianity” that he posits.

Imprecise Language

Burke uses some terminology in imprecise, confusing ways. (i) Burke’s subtitle refers to “A Minority Report.” In modern administrative procedure, a minority report is “a formal expression of the view of a group … that is different from the view of the majority.”\(^\text{13}\) This is a reasonable metaphor for a dissenting theological position expressed in early Christian literature. However, Burke’s empirical results construe the demythologised position on Satan and demons as the \textit{majority} view among the Apostolic Fathers. Relative to what majority do these writings constitute a dissenting minority? Burke never explains. In fact, Burke conceptualises the Apostolic Fathers’ “minority report” as the remainder of “a first century demythological Christianity” that contrasts mainly with “Christian texts from the mid-second century onwards.”\(^\text{14}\) This conveys the odd picture of a minority report that antedates the majority position

\(^{12}\) Ehrman, \textit{Apostolic Fathers}, 1:12.
from which it dissents! Burke could have resolved this oddity by acknowledging that belief in mythological evil is the majority view among the NT writers, but conspicuously never did so.

(ii) Burke interchanges the terms “Satan” and “satan” without explaining the distinction and without any obvious pattern. Furthermore, the adjective “satanological,” used frequently throughout, is never defined. Does it mean “pertaining to early Jewish or Christian concepts identifiable with that traditionally denoted by the word ‘Satan’”? “Pertaining to usage of the word satan in ancient languages”? Certain instances defy any conceivable meaning, such as when Burke (mis)represents Jacob Milgrom as anachronistically claiming that the Priestly writer has “deliberately minimized satanological terminology” in Leviticus.

(iii) Another terminological peculiarity is Burke’s contrast between an “Adamic (anthropogenic) etiology of sin” and an “Enochic or Satanic (mythological) etiology of sin.” Such language suggests an aetiology of primeval sin, since this is what the Adamic and Enochic myths offer. However, Burke places in the “Adamic” category any text that attaches

15 Burke usually omits the definite article when using the lowercase “satan.” He sometimes uses the lowercase when describing views of scholars who themselves used the uppercase (cf. Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 134). Furthermore, he avers that some early Christian texts “present strong belief in supernatural evil beings such as Satan and demons” (136), but later, when referring to these same texts, he reverts to the lowercase: “the angels of satan” (137); “the satan’s angels” (157). Numerous similar instances occur; no clear rationale for Burke’s interchange between “Satan” and “satan” appears.

16 This is the working definition of Satan herein. Deferring to Burke’s usage, the lowercase “satanology” is used herein. “Satan” and “the devil” are used here in deference to conventional English, although both ὁ σατανᾶς and ὁ διάβολος in early Christian texts are arguably Faktionsbezeichnungen better translated as “the Satan” and “the Devil” (Thomas J. Farrar, “New Testament Satanology and Leading Suprahuman Opponents in Second Temple Jewish Literature: A Religion-Historical Analysis,” JTS [forthcoming 2019]).

17 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 129, emphasis added. See further comment in online supplement.

anthropological causes to contemporary sin, even if the text never mentions Adam or primeval events. Similarly, Burke assigns an “Enochic etiology of sin” to Ignatius, who never mentions the Enochic watchers story but shows concern with contemporary sin. Furthermore, Burke contrasts an “Adamic” aetiology with a “mythological” aetiology, yet the Adamic aetiology is mythological under any conceivable definition of myth in biblical studies. This calls into question what Burke means by “myth”—a word he never defines but whose derivatives he uses over fifty times.

Logical Problems with the Structure of the Argument
False Dichotomies and Negative Evidence
Whereas Burke expresses his desire to reach “conclusions on the firm basis of positive evidence with complementary negative evidence” instead of “drawing unconfirmed conclusions from negative evidence,” most of his “positive evidence” is reducible to negative evidence. (i) Consider Burke’s juxtaposition of two aetiologies of sin. The “positive evidence” he proposes is “the writer’s explicitly expressed etiology of sin.” His positively-evidenced conclusion will follow, he maintains, when a writer expresses “an anthropogenic etiology of sin (rather than a supernatural etiology).” Likewise, he asks, “Does the writer communicate an Adamic (anthropogenic) etiology of sin, or an Enochic or Satanic (mythological) etiology of sin?” Yet Burke concedes that “God, humans, and Satan and evil spirits” as sources of evil in Jewish and Christian texts “are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that a text may exhibit more than one etiology.” He is aware, therefore, that “rather than” and “or” in the

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19 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 140–42, 149.
20 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 158.
21 See further comment in online supplement.
23 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 129, emphasis added.
24 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 135, emphasis added.
above-quoted methodological statements express a false dichotomy. An explicitly expressed anthropogenic aetiology of evil is not positive evidence against a writer having held a mythological aetiology of evil; it is neutral, because the two aetiologies can coexist. Meanwhile, the absence of an expressed mythological aetiology is negative evidence. Thus, while Burke claims that his methodology “avoids arguments from silence,” it does not. In fact, his study is replete with them.

(ii) As with aetiologies, Burke’s discussion of dualisms relies on “positive evidence” that, under scrutiny, turns out to be negative. Burke asks whether a writer shows concern with cosmic, ethical or psychological dualism, “or some combination of these dualistic views.” By allowing for “some combination,” Burke concedes that these dualistic views are not mutually exclusive. Yet he still insists that the presence of “psychological or ethical dualism” in a text would contribute to the conclusion that its writer held a “non-mythological etiology of evil.” Later, Burke states that Jeffrey Burton Russell “characterizes the dualism of Hermas as ethical rather than cosmological.” However, Russell does not set ethical and cosmological dualism in antithesis; this false dichotomy is Burke’s alone. Again, neither the presence of psychological or ethical dualism in a text nor the absence of cosmological dualism constitutes positive evidence against the writer’s worldview having been mythological. The former evidence is neutral (because compatible with mythological beliefs) while the latter is negative.

(iii) Burke’s use of marginalisation as a methodological category also introduces negative evidence. He poses the methodological question,  

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26 Burke does insist that “the Adamic” (anthropogenic) and “the Enochic” (satanological) aetiologies of evil “do not co-exist in Second Temple Period texts; they appear as mutually exclusive” (Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 131). He offers no substantiation of this claim, which is false (see below).


29 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 146, emphasis added.

“Does the writer exhibit marginalization or demythologization of satanological terminology?”31 One of his theses is that “certain texts among the Apostolic Fathers corpus exhibit significant marginalization of Satan and demons.”32 Marginalising for Burke apparently means “Showing no interest in” an idea;33 it may even be done “deliberately.”34 Marginalisation is less extreme than “non-belief in” an idea,35 and pertaining specifically to satanological terminology is less extreme than “demythologization.”36 By referring to “the marginalization or complete absence of satanological terminology” in a text,37 Burke implies that marginalisation of an idea correlates with frequency of mention: a writer who never or infrequently mentions an idea is disinterested in it. A writer’s disinterest in an idea is inferred not from expressed disinterest but from absence of expressed interest. Clearly, “marginalisation” too is a negative category of evidence.

Two of the three questions that Burke’s methodology asks of a text concern only negative evidence,38 while the third concerns partly negative (marginalisation) and partly positive evidence (demythologisation, on which see below). Burke thus departs significantly from his expressed intention to base “conclusions on positive evidence.”39 However, since Burke did intend to bolster his conclusions with “complementary negative evidence,” we must ask how weighty negative evidence is.

Some historians have a low valuation of negative evidence. David Hackett Fischer, for instance, avers that “evidence must always be affirmative. Negative evidence is a contradiction in terms—it is not evidence

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32 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 128.
33 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 160.
34 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 129.
37 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 133.
at all.”\textsuperscript{40} Michael Duncan observes that historiographers typically treat the argument from silence (AFS) as a fallacy,\textsuperscript{41} but takes a more balanced approach, warning that its “inherently vague evidential threshold for success” makes its use “something of a subjective art” but concluding that “interpretation of the strength or weakness of an AFS should proceed case-by-case.”\textsuperscript{42} John Lange likewise warns that an AFS “cannot be logically conclusive, and … can seldom be rationally conclusive, at least in interesting cases” but that, nonetheless, “some instances of the argument are more persuasive than others.”\textsuperscript{43} Lange offers a set of conditions for a conclusive AFS against the occurrence of a historical event. These conditions are reproduced below and modified to reflect our interest in the occurrence of a historical idea within an author’s belief system.

1. There is a document, D, extant, in which the [idea, I,] is not mentioned.
2. It was the intention of the author of D to enumerate exhaustively all members of the class of [ideas] of which [I] is supposed to be a member.
3. The author of D was acquainted with all members of the class in question.
4. [I] must be such that, if it [were part of his/her belief system], the author of D could not have overlooked it.\textsuperscript{44}

Burke’s study contains numerous AFS inferring Apostolic Fathers writers’ non-belief in or marginalisation of mythological evil (or particular mythological agents of evil, such as Satan or demons). Several of Burke’s AFS collapse at condition (1). In some cases, the silence from which he argues is not silence spanning an entire document but merely silence in an individual passage,\textsuperscript{45} or silence in a surviving fragment of an other-

\textsuperscript{42} Duncan, “Curious Silence”, 95–96.
\textsuperscript{44} Lange, “Argument from Silence,” 290.
\textsuperscript{45} Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 150, 155.
wise lost document. Often the silence itself is suspect: Burke builds satanological AFS from several documents that do or at least may mention Satan (see below on 1 Clement, 2 Clement, Martyrdom of Polycarp and Didache). Moreover, all of Burke’s AFS founder at condition (2): no Apostolic Fathers text states or implies an intention to “enumerate exhaustively” all aspects of the author’s belief system. Eighteen texts between the NT and Apostolic Fathers texts fail to explicitly mention angels (six Pauline letters; 1–3 John; Didache; 2 Clement; six Ignatian letters; Polycarp’s To the Philippians) and one brief text (3 John) fails to mention Christ. Surely some early Christian documents might likewise fail to mention Satan and/or demons by probabilistic accident, or—given the sinister connotations of these concepts—for stylistic or pastoral reasons. Renowned biblical scholars Martin Hengel and N. T. Wright have warned of the danger of AFS in Pauline studies; their caveat should be extended to the Apostolic Fathers. There are circumstances under which a persuasive AFS might be mounted against an author having had a satanology, but these circumstances are not present in any of the Apostolic Fathers.

Demythologisation as Positive Evidence
Demythologisation remains as Burke’s sole avenue of genuinely positive evidence. Demythologisation, as Burke uses the term, occurs when an author either (i) removes mythological meaning from mythological language that s/he uses (e.g., by “re-applying [the language of evil spirits

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46 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 160.
47 See online supplement for an illustrative thought experiment regarding Paul’s and Ignatius’s writings.
48 Both observe that we would have no record of Pauline belief in and practice of the Lord’s Supper were it not for the situation in Corinth that necessitated the remarks in 1 Cor 10–11. “These circumstances should warn us against a misuse of the argumentum e silentio which has been particularly popular in New Testament exegesis. We need always to be cautious where we know so little” (Martin Hengel, The Pre-Christian Paul [London: SCM, 1991], 27; cf. N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013], 58 n. 129).
49 See discussion in online supplement of some examples.
and demons] to human passions and vices”), or (ii) removes mythological language altogether when redacting source material. The adjective “demythological” pertains to documents, or even a “Christianity,” with a “demythologized…perspective.”

How do we identify the first type of demythologisation? How do we determine that a writer has stripped mythological terminology of mythological meaning? Burke repeatedly assumes that terminology is devoid of mythological meaning unless the writer explicitly defines it mythologically (see below on Did. 8.2; 1 Clem. 51.1; 2 Clem. 18.2; Mart. Pol. 2.4 [3.1]; 17.1). This again reduces to an AFS, and an unreasonable one, since a writer using familiar language with its ordinary meaning is likely to do so cursorily. It is a writer deviating from the ordinary meaning (e.g., demythologising) who is likely to explicitly signal this intention. Thus, ceteris paribus, mythological language should be understood to bear mythological meaning. If identifying the first type of demythologisation requires positive evidence of a semantic shift, identifying the second type (elimination of mythological language during redaction) entails mapping literary dependencies and reconstructing source texts (possibly hypothetical ones). This may involve considerable uncertainty and even conjecture.

Now, if demythologisation of either type is demonstrably present in a text, this is positive evidence: it represents something a writer has done, not something a writer has not done. The question, though, is positive evidence of what? As Burke acknowledges in principle, demythologisation may be deliberate or otherwise. Even when deliberate, demythologisation does not necessarily imply “rejecting a belief in” or “non-belief in” a mythological idea. For instance, the writer may be unsure about the audience’s familiarity with the mythological idea, or

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50 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 147.
51 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 140–42.
53 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 141.
54 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 130, 149, 160.
feel uncomfortable discussing it due to the audience’s (or the writer’s own) perceived spiritual immaturity. Despite these pitfalls, demythologisation is Burke’s most promising methodological category, since it alone involves positive evidence.

It is worth mentioning two methodological categories that involve positive evidence but that Burke’s methodology omitted: (i) explicit statements about non-belief in mythological evil, and (ii) statements arguing for belief in mythological evil (suggesting that such belief was controversial or novel).\(^{55}\) Unfortunately for Burke’s thesis, both categories are empirical voids in early Christian literature.

**AN ASSESSMENT OF BURKE’S ANALYSIS**

**Interaction with Previous Scholarly Approaches**

Burke critiques previous scholarly approaches to supernatural evil in the Apostolic Fathers, but surprisingly neglects to interact with a standard work, namely Francis X. Gokey’s.\(^{56}\) This was no oversight: Burke uses his longest footnote to dismiss Gokey’s work, citing its age, a description of it as “Basic research,” and criticism from a single review. However, other reviewers praised Gokey’s study for its useful exegetical notes—an irony, since Burke complains about the lack of exegetical detail on Apostolic Fathers passages in the works he does cite.\(^{57}\) Burke laments how Bernard J. Bamberger and K. Schäferdiek respectively state that the Apostolic Fathers “simply affirm” or “presuppose” the existence of Satan (exactly as we would expect writers to do if Satan was an established, uncontroversial concept in their thought-world!). Burke also faults Russell for “consistently assum[ing] all instances of satanas and diabolos refer

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\(^{55}\) For further comment, see online supplement.


\(^{57}\) Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 128. For further comments and a short survey of reviews of Gokey, see online supplement.
to a personal supernatural evil being.”58 Yet this assumption is plausible concerning arthrous ὁ διάβολος and ὁ σατανᾶς since, by the early second century, these had become technical terms for a personal supernatural evil being. This is an established result of New Testament scholarship, as can be confirmed from relevant entries in standard reference works (e.g., TDNT, NIDNTTE, BDAG, ABD, RPP, TRE, etc.).59 To challenge this consensus would require a thorough study of first-century Christian satanology, its Jewish background and its associated terminology. Burke makes some forays in this direction (to be discussed next), but offers nothing that renders Russell’s assumption unreasonable.

**Burke’s Claims concerning Second Temple Judaism**

*Two Mutually Exclusive Aetiologies of Evil*

Burke refers to “general agreement” that “two conflicting etiologies of evil” emerged in Second Temple Judaism, namely Adamic (anthropogenic) and Enochic (satanological/supernatural).60 Burke claims, without any substantiation, that “these etiologies do not co-exist in Second Temple Period texts; they appear as mutually exclusive.”61 Without

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58 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 128. Actually, Russell does not appear to assume that the anarthrous διάβολοι of Pol. Phil. 5.2 are personal supernatural evil beings.


60 Burke makes this claim just after citing Daphna Arbel, but she was making a rather different point than he—see further comment in online supplement.
depriving Burke of his rightful burden of proof, we will register three pre-emptive objections to this claim. (i) The claim is reductionist since “Adamic” aetiology is not purely anthropogenic, nor is “Enochic” aetiology purely supernatural. (ii) Several later Second Temple Jewish texts contain both anthropogenic and supernatural elements in their aetiology of evil, or even blend them together. (iii) Supernatural and anthropogenic aetiologies of evil are combined in several first-century Christian texts.62

Marginalisation/Demythologisation of Satanological Terminology
Burke posits “evidence in Second Temple Period Judaism for a distinct (though marginal) trend of marginalization or non-mythological use of satanological terminology.”63 He then briefly summarises Second Temple usage of the terms שטן/σατανᾶς and διάβολος, noting that they often occur as common nouns. Indisputably, שטן and διάβολος functioned as common nouns long before they became “satanological terminology.” However, their continued use as common nouns in Second Temple Judaism does not imply “marginalization or non-mythological use of satanological terminology.” Rather, it indicates that these terms had not yet become “satanological terminology”; at least not exclusively. The “trend” in Second Temple Judaism is opposite to that posited by Burke: rather than satanological terminology devolving into non-satanological terminology, satanological terminology evolves.64 This observation obviates the need for detailed interaction with Burke’s analysis of “satanological terminology” in Second Temple Jewish literature.65

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62 For detailed discussion of these three objections, see online supplement.
64 On these terminological and conceptual developments, see Stokes, “What is a Demon,” 271; Wieger, “Celui qu’on appelle διάβολος,” 209–12; Farrar, “New Testament Satanology.”
65 It is, however, worth noting that Burke makes some statements that suggest he fails to appreciate the significance of the Greek article. See further online supplement.
One instance (that Burke does not mention) where a Second Temple Jewish writer has likely demythologised what had or would become satanological terminology is 4QBarkhi Nafshi (4Q436 1–2 and 4Q437 4 par 4Q438 4a 2). Reworking Zech 3, the writer replaces הר שטן (which in Zechariah denotes a celestial being) with the abstract term יצăr רע, in a “process of abstraction” or demythologisation. Notice how conspicuous this demythologising move is, relative to those that Burke claims to have detected in early Christian literature.

Burke’s survey gives inadequate attention to Job 1–2 and Zech 3:1–2, which in the Hebrew Bible and the Septuagint contributed significantly to the development of הר שטן (and its transliterations) and ὁ διάβολος respectively into satanological terminology. He also fails to mention numerous Second Temple apocalyptic texts that illuminate conceptual and/or terminological developments in satanology.

Non-Belief in Satan or Demons
Burke claims that “a number of Second Temple Period Jewish texts exhibit non-belief in Satan or demons,” citing Ben Sira, 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch. This may not hold for Ben Sira (at least as far as Satan is concerned), while the other two texts probably post-date the Second Temple period. Hence, as Burke himself acknowledges with citations from Gabriele Boccaccini and Paolo Sacchi, 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch may rather

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67 So Susanne Rudnig-Zelt: “Die LXX bildet die Brücke vom altestamentlichen Satan zum späteren Teufel, indem sie das Nomen שטן in den Texten über eine himmlische Satansfigur Sach 3,1b.2; Hi 1,6ff; I Chr 21,1 meist als (ὁ) διάβολος übersetzt” (“Der Teufel und der alttestamentliche Monotheismus,” in Das Böse, der Teufel und Dämonen – Evil, the Devil, and Demons, eds. Jan Dochhorn, Susanne Rudnig-Zelt, and Benjamin Wold, WUNT 412 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016], 1 n. 1).


69 See comments in online supplement.

70 Burke cites Boccaccini second-hand via Eve, and his representation of Boccaccini’s
be evidence for diminution in Jewish belief in cosmic evil shortly after 70 C.E.: “In Jewish writings of the end of the first century the devil suddenly disappears.” Nevertheless, that Second Temple Jewish beliefs about supernatural evil were “non-uniform” is a fair assessment.

Burke’s Claims concerning First-Century Christian Literature

Burke states that “first-century Christian belief in supernatural evil” “[e]merg[ed] within this [non-uniform] Second Temple Period background” and (therefore?) “was similarly non-uniform.” However, it cannot be assumed that early Christianity inherited all the theological diversity of Second Temple Judaism. For instance, if the historical Jesus firmly believed in Satan and demons (as numerous dominical sayings and exorcisms in the canonical gospels attest), this would have influenced his followers’ worldview. Moreover, if Jewish diminution of belief in fallen angels and the devil occurred primarily after 70 C.E., this trend was too late to have influenced the Jesus movement’s origins. Indeed, it may represent a proto-rabbinic Jewish reaction against Christian ideas about evil, in which case it hardly characterises the Jewish background from which Christian ideas about evil emerged.

Burke turns to the NT for direct evidence of non-uniformity in first-century Christian belief in supernatural evil. No NT authorial category lacks terminology pertaining to mythological evil, nor does the NT contain the kinds of positive evidence of non-belief in mythological evil mentioned above (p. 166). Burke identifies no conspicuous instance of point goes beyond what Boccaccini himself claimed (see online supplement).

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71 Paolo Sacchi, “The Devil in Jewish Traditions of the Second Temple Period (c. 500 BCE-100 CE),” in *Jewish Apocalyptic and Its History*, trans. William J. Short, JSPSup 20 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990), 231. He bases this on 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and 2 Enoch (in which he regards the Satanael material as late interpolations).

72 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 134.

73 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 134.

74 See further comment in online supplement.

75 See Farrar and Williams, “Talk of the Devil,” 75–76.
demythologisation; he merely identifies NT writers who used such terminology but for whom there is debate concerning how “real” these concepts were. He concentrates his attention on Paul and the Fourth Evangelist, offering a superficial, one-sided survey of previous research on their views concerning Satan and demons. Without entering into this debate here, we can note that a growing body of recent research supports the “realness” of mythological evil in Paul’s worldview. Furthermore, whereas Burke suggests that Paul used satanological terminology only “to accommodate his audience,” Erkki Koskenniemi concludes that “a concept similar to Satan was alien to traditional Greek thought.” Therefore, the satanological terminology in letters to Greek Christian communities that Paul had founded (e.g., in Corinth and Thessalonica) cannot be accommodation; more likely it alludes to a concept known to them from Paul’s own teaching. Similarly, the “ruler of this world” in John is widely understood as a demonic being rather than a demythologised abstraction. Nor does John’s silence on Jesus’ exorcisms supply a persuasive AFS that the author disbelieved in demons. Thus, while the degree of reification of mythological evil in Pauline and Johannine theology remains controversial, the NT furnishes no unambiguous evidence for “a first century demythological Christianity” that rejected belief in Satan and/or demons. Surprisingly, Burke offers almost no comment on the satanology and demonology of such major NT

76 Concerning Paul, he cites Caird’s suggestion that Paul may have viewed Satan as a personification rather than a person and Dunn’s view that Paul held a demythologised view of evil, retaining satanological and demonological terminology only to accommodate his readers.

77 See references in online supplement.

78 Erkki Koskenniemi, “‘For We are Unaware of His Schemes’: Satan and Cosmological Dualism in the Gentile Mission,” in Das Böse, der Teufel und Dämonen – Evil, the Devil, and Demons, eds. Jan Dochhorn, Susanne Rudnig-Zelt, and Benjamin Wold, WUNT 412 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 120.


80 See comment and references in online supplement.

81 See comment and references in online supplement.
documents as the Synoptic Gospels, Acts, and Revelation, and conspicuously refrains from acknowledging that any NT writer believed in supernatural evil.

Burke’s Exegesis of the Apostolic Fathers

Let us turn to Burke’s exegetical analysis of the five Apostolic Fathers texts in which he finds “significant marginalization of Satan and demons”: Didache, 1 Clement, 2 Clement, Shepherd of Hermes, and Martyrdom of Polycarp.

The Didache

Burke’s analysis of the Didache is the strongest part of his argument since it contains some positive evidence of demythologisation. Burke first observes that the Didache’s “Two Ways” material, in contrast to that in 1QS and Barnabas, “has completely removed any reference to Satan and his angels.” He further asserts that “this deliberate anti-mythological approach is followed consistently throughout the Didache.” To support the latter claim, he argues that the Didache “excludes any association of idols with demons (6.3),” that τοῦ πονηροῦ in Did. 8.2 refers to “evil” and not “the evil one”, that “both the true and false prophet are using the same spirit” according to Did. 11.7–12, and that the “world-deceiver” of Did. 16.4 is a non-mythological human persecutor. He concludes that the Didache “repudiates” belief in mythological evil.

While Burke is correct that the Didache’s Two Ways tradition eliminates mythological content and that the Didache contains no certain references to mythological evil, his case is otherwise overstated. First, Huub van de Sandt and David Flusser’s reconstruction of the hypothetical Two Ways source closely follows the Doctrina Apostolorum in its opening sentence, referring to “two angels … one of righteousness, the other of iniquity.” Since the Didache’s Two Ways source probably did

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82 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 136–42.
not mention Satan, the Didachist did not remove a reference to Satan; rather, Barnabas added a reference to Satan that the original template lacked.\footnote{Jonathan A. Draper, “Barnabas and the Riddle of the Didache Revisited,” \textit{JSNT} 58 (1995): 98, 102.} The Didachist (or an upstream redactor)\footnote{Cf. Kurt Niederwimmer, \textit{The Didache}, trans. Linda M. Maloney, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 63.} removed a reference to the angel of iniquity—and the angel of righteousness (Did. 1.1). Burke assumes that this omission was deliberate and motivated by an “anti-mythological approach.” Both assumptions are questionable. Van de Sandt and Flusser note uncertainty over whether the absence of the two angels from the Didache “occurred by accident in the course of transmission” or is “the result of a deliberate attempt to ethicize the tradition.”\footnote{Van de Sandt and Flusser, \textit{Didache}, 63; similarly Clayton N. Jefford, \textit{The Sayings of Jesus in the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles}, VCSup 11 (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 27.} A deliberate move is more likely,\footnote{See online supplement for a list of scholars supporting this view.} but this would not imply the writer’s non-belief in mythological evil. There are other plausible explanations, although choosing among them necessarily involves speculation.\footnote{One possibility is suggested in Ign. \textit{Trall.} 5.1–2, where (immediately after mentioning the satanic “ruler of this age”) Ignatius describes angelology and cosmology as topics that could cause “infants” to “choke”, i.e. as somewhat “esoteric knowledge” (William R. Schoedel, \textit{Ignatius of Antioch}, Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985], 144). The Didache’s community might have omitted angelology from their basic catechetical material for a similar reason. For other possible explanations mentioned in the literature, see online supplement.} Moreover, if Burke infers the Didachist’s non-belief in \textit{bad} angels from the deletion of the angel of iniquity, he ought also to infer the Didachist’s non-belief in \textit{good} angels from the deletion of the angel of righteousness. After all, the extant text of the Didache never mentions angels.\footnotemark

The Didache contains no unambiguous reference to Satan or demons, but several possible references. Burke reasons that since the Didache elsewhere refers to evil only generically (\textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{παντὸς πονηροῦ}, 3.1; \textit{πα}
10.5), τὸν πονηρὸν in the Didache’s version of the Lord’s Prayer (8.2) is also generic rather than referring to “the evil one,” Satan. However, as Raymond E. Brown points out, “in NT usage, when ponēros means ‘evil’ in the abstract, the word ‘all’ usually appears before it.”90 Didache 8.2 departs from the common construction for abstract evil that occurs in 3.1 and 10.5. Similarly, Anton Vögtle contends that if “preservation from every evil” was the sense in the Lord’s Prayer, πονηρὸν should be anarthrous.91 Burke next claims there is no pre-Christian witness to usage of ὁ πονηρὸς for a supernatural evil being, but is refuted by the very scholar he cites in support!92 Moreover, ὁ πονηρὸς is widely attested as a satanological term elsewhere in early Christian literature.93 Particularly relevant is the likelihood that τὸν πονηρὸν refers to Satan in the identical petition in Matt 6:13b.94 Since the Didache probably has no literary

92 Matthew Black notes that other scholars have used the lack of precedent as justification for a non-satanic interpretation of τὸν πονηρὸν in Matt 6:13b. Black himself then points out that in 4Q286 5 “we find the Hebrew והרשע used as a proper name to describe Satan or Belial,” i.e. “an exact Hebrew equivalent” for ὁ πονηρὸς. Black adds that even aside from this limited evidence, the designation “the evil one” “seems almost an inevitable one for the Prince of Darkness” (Matthew Black, “The Doxology to the Pater Noster with a Note on Matthew 6.13b,” in A Tribute to Geza Vermes: Essays on Jewish and Christian Literature and History, eds. Philip R. Davies and Richard T. White, JSOTSup 100 [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990], 334–36).
93 Cf. Matt 5:37; 6:13; 13:19; 13:38; John 17:15; Eph 6:16; 2 Thess 3:3; 1 John 2:13–14; 3:12; 5:18-19; Barn. 2.10; 21.3; Mart. Pol. 17.1. Russell, Satan, 39 n. 21, states, “The usage [of ho ponēros for the devil] is so established that it lends considerable weight to the argument that the ending of the Lord’s Prayer refers specifically to the Devil.”
94 “Evil One” vs. “evil” in Matt 6:13b is an ancient exegetical debate and numerous contemporary scholars line up on both sides. For a detailed discussion, see Farrar and Williams, “Diabolical Data,” 44–46.
dependence on Matthew, their agreements in this prayer likely “rest on a common liturgical tradition.” The probability that Matthew understood τοῦ πονηροῦ to be Satan thus suggests, ceteris paribus, that the Didachist did too.

While noteworthy, the Didache’s silence on demons and exorcism does not imply the author-compiler’s non-belief in these phenomena. Nor does the Didache’s polemical description of idols as “dead gods” imply, as Burke claims, that “the Didache excludes any association of idols with demons.” Justin Martyr, who clearly associates idols with demons, also calls idols “dead and lifeless” (1 Apol. 9.1). The conclusion that the Didachist excludes any association of idols with demons because he does not mention such association underscores Burke’s reliance on negative evidence.

The Didache’s instructions concerning prophets and pseudo-prophets (11.7–12) characterise both as speaking ἐν πνεύματι. Burke’s suggestion that a pseudo-prophet is one “claiming to speak ‘in the [Holy] Spirit’ when in fact he is not” contradicts the text, which presupposes that pseudo-prophets do speak ἐν πνεύματι. Burke’s other suggestion, that a pseudo-prophet is one “abusing the gift of speaking ‘in the [Holy] Spirit’” is plausible, but “the [Holy]” is an interpretative gloss. ἐν πνεύματι may refer to the phenomenon of spirit possession without specifying which spirit, so the text does not necessarily imply that prophets and pseudo-prophets are using the same spirit, as Burke claims. Instead, it may imply that the false prophet is inspired by a de-

95 Aaron E. Milavec calls this an “emerging consensus” among specialists (“A Rejoinder,” JECS 13 [2005]: 523). See further references in online supplement.
96 Niederwimmer, Didache, 136; similarly van de Sandt and Flusser, Didache, 295.
97 Although the text of the petition (and thus the syntactic ambiguity) is identical in Matthew and the Didache, Matthew offers far more contextual material for interpreting τοῦ πονηροῦ (including many passages about evil and several other instances of ὁ πονηρὸς or τοῦ πονηροῦ specifically). Hence it is unsurprising that scholars seldom offer detailed comments on τοῦ πονηροῦ in Did. 8.2 except in conjunction with exegesis of Matt 6:13b. For a survey of scholarly decisions (and indecision) on the rendering of τοῦ πονηροῦ in Did. 8.2, see online supplement.
monic spirit.\textsuperscript{98} Admittedly, in the NT and Apostolic Fathers, \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι} almost always refers to the Holy Spirit’s or Spirit of God’s activity. Often \textit{ἀγίω} or \textit{θεόν} is affixed to make this explicit,\textsuperscript{99} but not always.\textsuperscript{100} On two occasions \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι ἀκαθάρτῳ} is used to describe possession by an evil spirit (Mark 1:23; 5:2). The NT never uses the unqualified \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι} of an evil spirit, but neither does the NT ever describe false prophets as speaking in the Holy Spirit. Moreover, whereas the Didache envisions that someone speaking \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι} might say “Give me money,” 1 Cor 12:3 declares that no one speaking \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι} \textit{θεόν} ever says “Jesus be accursed.” For Paul, one who speaks evil under inspiration is apparently not speaking \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι} \textit{θεόν} but in another spirit.\textsuperscript{101} The Didache might presuppose the same for one who speaks evil while \textit{ἐν πνεῦματι}. The notion that true and false prophets operate under the influence of different spirits is present already in the Hebrew Bible (1 Kgs 22:19–24 par. 2 Chr 18:18–23).\textsuperscript{102} Christianised versions of this idea are found in Revelation and Shepherd of Hermas.\textsuperscript{103} John the Seer depicts a demonic spirit proceeding \textit{from the mouth} of the false prophet (Rev 16:13–14; cf. “a lying spirit in the


\textsuperscript{99} Matt 3:11; 12:28; Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16; John 1:33; Acts 1:5; 11:16; Rom 9:1; 14:17; 15:16; 1 Cor 12:3; 1 Thess 1:5; 1 Pet 1:12; Jude 20.

\textsuperscript{100} Matt 22:43; Eph. 2:22; 3:5; 6:18; Col 1:8; Rev 1:10; 4:2; 17:3; 21:10; Ign. \textit{Magn.} 13.1; Barn. 9.7; 10.2, 9; 14.2.

\textsuperscript{101} Note Paul’s mention of the gift of \textit{διαχρίσεις πνευμάτων} (plural) in the same passage (1 Cor 12:10) even as he emphasises the “one”-ness and “same”-ness of the \textit{πνεῦμα} that works in the church. On charismatic utterances in the Corinthian church as the situation behind 1 Cor 12:3, see James D. G. Dunn, \textit{The Theology of Paul the Apostle} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 595.


\textsuperscript{103} For the notion that false teachers are inspired by evil spirits, see 1 John 4:1–13; 1 Tim 4:1.
mouth of all his prophets,” 1 Kgs 22:22).\textsuperscript{104} Hermas asserts that false prophets have no power of a divine spirit but are filled with the devil’s spirit, while (like the Didache) associating false prophets with greed (Mand. 11.3–17).

The Didache’s apocalyptic ending foretells,

Then the world-deceiver (ὁ κοσμοπλανής) will be manifest as a son of God. He will perform signs and wonders, and the earth will be delivered over into his hands. He will perform lawless deeds, unlike anything done from eternity (Did. 16.4).

Who is the world-deceiver? Burke rejects as “unlikely in the extreme” that the Didache, having previously “avoided all satanological and demonological terminology” (a questionable claim given 8.2 and 11.7–12), “would at this point introduce Satan using a unique term not used in any earlier Jewish or Christian texts.” However, the Didache is a compilation of different source materials and “cannot be considered a homogeneous text.”\textsuperscript{105} The Didachist probably took the term ὁ κοσμοπλανής from his apocalyptic source (implying that it had been used in an earlier text). Moreover, Burke’s reasons for rejecting a satanological interpretation of the world-deceiver apply equally to his own eschatological-human-persecutor interpretation: the text would still “at this point introduce,” “using a unique term,” an eschatological opponent whose existence the Didache has hitherto “avoided” mentioning.

No scholarly consensus exists on the world-deceiver’s relationship to Satan. For some, he is a human without diabolical associations;\textsuperscript{106} for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[104] By contrast, Acts describes the Holy Spirit as speaking through the mouth of David (1:16; 4:25).
\item[106] For Aaron E. Milavec, \textit{The Didache: Faith, Hope and Life of the Earliest Christian Communities} [Mahwah: Paulist, 2003], 332, 648, the Didache does not endorse the idea found in 2 Thess 2:9 that the antichrist figure’s signs and wonders have Satan as their source. Elsewhere he asserts that “The end-times scenario of the Didache deliberately removes any reference to Satan.” See further references in online supplement.
\end{footnotes}
others, a human with diabolical associations, or the devil himself. It is probably best to concede the ambiguity. What is clear is that the world-deceiver is a “supernatural enemy.” This figure therefore undercuts Burke’s claim that the Didache is “anti-mythological,” “deliberately avoiding all references to supernatural evil.”

1 Clement
In discussing 1 Clement, Burke flatly asserts that this text “uses no satanological terminology.” This contradicts an apparently unanimous consensus that 1 Clem. 51.1 mentions Satan: “And so we should ask to be forgiven for all the errors we have committed and the deeds we have performed through any of the machinations of the Enemy” (διὰ τινος τῶν τοῦ ἀντικειμένου). Burke interacts with no previous scholarship on this passage, nor does he even offer an interpretation beyond a vague proposal that ὁ ἀντικείμενος is “human.” Yet the scholarly consensus on 1 Clem. 51.1 is well-founded: this writer clearly believed in Satan, whom he casts in the familiar role of tempter.

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107 See online supplement for scholars supporting these latter two views.
109 So Thomas O’Loughlin, The Didache: A Window on the Earliest Christians (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 137. When used passively with a personal subject, φαίνω often has epiphanic connotations (see especially Matt 24:30; also 1:20; 2:13; 2:19; Luke 9:8). The nearest terminological parallels to ὁ κοσμοπλανής in early Christian literature occur in texts reflecting belief in mythological evil (Rev 12:9; Apoc. Pet. 2.12; cf. Niederwimmer, Didache, 219). Other texts describe Satan or a Satan-associated figure as disguising himself (2 Cor 11:14; Ascen. Isa. 4.6), performing signs and wonders (2 Thess 2:8–10; Rev 13:2, 13; Ascen. Isa. 4.4–11) and/or deceiving people (John 8:44; Acts 5:3; 2 Cor 4:4; 2 Thess 2:8–10; Rev 12:9; Ascen. Isa. 4.7–10). The plural antichrist figures of the Johannine epistles (cf. Farrar and Williams, “Diabolical Data,” 60–61, on 1 John 4:4) and Matthew (24:24 read with 13:38–39) likely have implicit satanological associations.
110 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 142–43.
111 For a long list of scholars who interpret τοῦ ἀντικειμένου here as Satan, see online supplement.
112 τοῦ ἀντικειμένου in 1 Clem. 51.1 clearly functions as a substantive, and since it is
Next, Burke adduces “clear evidence for the author understanding diabolos with a human referent” from 1 Clem. 3.4. This passage rebukes the Corinthians for their “impious jealousy” (ζῆλον ἁδικον), reminding them that through jealousy “death entered into the world.” This phrase quotes from Wis 2:24a, which reads φθόνω δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. 1 Clement’s quotation begins from θάνατος and thus omits διαβόλου. Moreover, 1 Clement attributes the Corinthians’ jealousy not to the devil but to “the desires of [one’s] evil heart,” then interprets Wis 2:24a with respect to the story of Cain and Abel (1 Clem. 4.1–7).

Burke sees in this passage “evidence for Clement’s anthropogenic etiology of sin.” True, but this does not imply that “Clement’s etiology of sin is anthropogenic (Adamic), rather than Satanic,” since this is a false dichotomy, and the latter aetiology is attested in 1 Clem. 51.1. Burke also asserts that “Clement interprets the diabolos here as a reference to Cain, which many scholars believe is the meaning intended,” and which “differentiates him sharply from the many later Christian commentators who read [Wis 2:24] as a reference to Satan.” A number of contemporary scholars identify διαβόλου in Wis 2:24 as Cain or the generic evildoer.113 If this is correct, and if the author of 1 Clement understood

arthrous, “the adversary” (or some synonymous noun such as enemy or opponent) is the best translation. The writer does not explicitly identify “the adversary,” so one must ask, who is “the adversary” par excellence whom early Christians regarded as a cause of sin? The obvious answer is Satan, whose function as a tempter or seducer of people is prominent in early Christian texts. Moreover, ἄντικείμενος is one possible translation of ἡς and occurs not infrequently as a satanological term in early Christian texts (on the background of this term, see G. J. M. Bartelink, “ANTIKEIMENOS (Widersacher) als Teufels- und Dämonenbezeichnung,” Sacris Erudiri 30 [1987]: 205–24; Farrar and Williams, “Diabolical Data,” 58–59). Ο ἄντικείμενος is arguably used for Satan in 1 Tim 5:14 (Farrar and Williams, “Diabolical Data,” 58–59), something Burke denies with minimal argumentation. Burke also misrepresents Philip H. Towner as a supporter of his non-satanological interpretation of 1 Tim 5:14. Towner actually avers, “the enemy’ here is apparently Satan” (Philip H. Towner, The Letters to Timothy and Titus, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006], 356–57).

113 See references in online supplement.
διάβολος in Wis 2:24 to be Cain (as seems likely), what we have is not demythologisation but an anthropological interpretation of an anthropological (and anarthrous) occurrence of διάβολος. Therefore, 1 Clement’s use of Wis 2:24 in no way contradicts the belief in Satan that the writer expresses in 51.1. That the writer mentioned Satan only once in this lengthy composition suggests that Satan had only a minor role in his theological outlook, though his satanological reticence might also be attributable to the letter’s delicate rhetorical task.

2 Clement
We next consider Burke’s treatment of 2 Clement. As with 1 Clement, this document contains one universally recognised reference to Satan (2 Clem. 18.2), which Burke tendentiously disputes. In a statement similar to 1 Clem. 51.1, this (different) author stresses his own sinfulness and laments being “still surrounded by the instruments of the Devil” (τοῖς ὀργάνοις τοῦ διαβόλου). The meaning of ὁ διάβολος is not explained—understandably, since by the mid-second century this was a long-established Christian technical term for Satan. Despite

114 1 Clement clearly understands Wis 2:24 as an allusion to the story of Cain and Abel, and implicitly attributes jealousy and envy (ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος) to Cain (1 Clem. 4.7). Since Wis 2:24 attributes φθόνος to διάβολος, it seems 1 Clement identifies this διάβολος with Cain. It is not impossible, though, that 1 Clement understands διάβολος in Wis 2:24 to be the devil but ignores the devil’s envy, since Cain’s fratricidal envy is more relevant to the envy between “brothers” in Corinth (1 Clem. 3.2; 4.7).

115 For other non-satanological use of anarthrous διάβολος in early Christian texts that elsewhere reflect belief in the διάβολος, Satan, see 1 Tim 3:11 (cf. 3:6–7); 2 Tim 3:3 (cf. 2:26); Pol. Phil. 5.2 (cf. 7.1); possibly John 6:70 (cf. 8:44; 13:2).

116 See further comment in online supplement.


118 See online supplement for a list of scholars supporting the satanological interpretation.

119 Again, see Wieger, “Celui qu’on appelle διάβολος,” on the development of διάβολος into a technical satanological term. The arthrous singular ὁ διάβολος is used satanologically 29 times in the NT writings. Also prior to or roughly contemporary with 2 Clement, ὁ διάβολος was used satanologically four times by Ignatius, once by Polycarp, and about two dozen times by Hermas. G. W. H. Lampe finds only four occurrences of
having expected a mention of the devil in the preceding paragraph (17.4–7), Burke sees no reason to interpret τοῦ διαβόλου as the devil, claiming that it “reads naturally as a referent to non-supernatural opposition,” and incorrectly citing Christopher M. Tuckett in support.\(^{120}\) As with 1 Clem. 51.1, Burke hardly describes—much less defends—his unique interpretation. He hurries along to couple the alleged silence on mythological evil with positive evidence for “an anthropogenic etiology of sin,” thereby concluding that 2 Clement belongs to demythological Christianity. Burke neglects to discuss the anarthrous πνεῦμα mentioned in 2 Clem. 20.4, which some scholars regard as a possible reference to Satan or a watcher.\(^{121}\)

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**Shepherd of Hermas**

Burke’s analysis of Shepherd of Hermas maintains the widely held view of single authorship,\(^{122}\) with Visions 1–4 composed in the late the first century and the other parts (Visions 5, Mandates and Similitudes) following decades later. However, Burke hypothesises a radical diachronic shift in the author’s theology. When writing Visions 1–4, Hermas avoided demonological and satanological terminology because he “held a διάβολος in all of patristic literature—all anarthrous—that do not denote the devil (A Patristic Greek Lexicon [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961], 344–45; cf. Pol. Phil. 5.2; Const. ap. 3.12.3; Chrysostom, Hom. 2 Tim. 8.1; Procopius Gazaenus, Exegetica Gen. 1.2). Moreover, the association of Satan with πειρασμός is common in the NT (e.g., Matt 4:1–11; 6:13; Mark 1:13; Luke 4:1–13; 1 Cor 7:5; 1 Thess 3:5; Rev 2:10).\(^{120}\) Presumably Burke is drawing on Tuckett’s comment on 18.2 that “the precise reference here remains obscure” (2 Clement: Introduction, Text, and Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012], 289). However, Tuckett is referring to the rare term τοῖς ῥγάνοις (“tools” or “instruments”) and not to τοῦ διαβόλου. He translates τοῦ διαβόλου “of the devil” without discussion—presumably because he considers the referent obvious.

\(^{121}\) Cf. Charles E. Hill, Regnum Caeolorum: Patterns of Future Hope in Early Christianity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 89; Tuckett, 2 Clement, 301. Both scholars admit that this text is difficult and the referent of πνεῦμα unclear. The obscurity of this text at least ought to serve as a check on any AFS concerning the writer’s allegedly demythologised worldview.

\(^{122}\) Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 143–49.
strongly demythologized view.” When writing the later parts, Hermas still rejected belief in supernatural demons but now believed in a supernatural devil. Consequently he used demythologised demonological terminology and mythological satanological terminology. Burke describes his hypothesis as a “simple” and “efficient” explanation of the evidence, but is it simple or efficient to posit internal inconsistency in a writer’s worldview, not only diachronic but also synchronic (since the later Hermas’ belief in the devil conflicted with his disbelief in demons)?

Satanological and demonological terminology is distributed very unevenly even in Hermas’ later writings, which cannot be ascribed to diachronic theological reversal. Burke’s hypothesis thus lacks explanatory power relative to the distribution of mythological language in Shepherd of Hermas as a whole. Robert Joly expressed doubt that the different

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123 See online supplement for discussion of whether the beast of Vis. 4 is consistent with Burke’s reading.

124 Burke incorrectly states that “Satanological terminology is found frequently in Vision 5 and Mandates, but there is only one use of diablos in Parables.” In fact, Visions 5 contains no demonological, satanological or bad-angel terminology. Mandates contains 22 or 23 references to διάβολος (the second occurrence in 7.3 is textually uncertain), plus six references to ὁ ἄγγελος τῆς πονηρίας (all in 6.2) and numerous references to demons and evil spirits. Similitudes (a.k.a. Parables) contains one or two references to διάβολος (8.3.6 [textually uncertain] and 9.31.2 [extant only in Latin]), and three references to “the lord of this city” or equivalent (1.3–6), which probably refers allegorically to Satan (so Gokey, Terminology, 131, 174 n. 100; Hill, Regnum Caelorum, 82–83; [cautiously] Norbert Brox, Der Hirt des Hermas, KAV 7 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991], 286–87; Farrar, “Intimate and Ultimate Adversary”; differently Carolyn Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, Hermeneia [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999], 158–59). Similitudes contains just three demonological terms (9.18.3; 9.22.3; 9.23.5; although arguably all references to “women in black” in Sim. 9 should be counted as such) and one reference to “the angel of luxury and deceit” (6.2.1). Thus, among the works regarded as composed late in Hermas’ career, the language of mythological evil is dense in Mandates, sparse in Similitudes, and absent from Vis. 5. There are several discrete portions within Mandates and Similitudes without references to mythological evil, e.g., Mand. 8, Sim. 2–5, 7, 10.

125 On the uneven distribution of angel/spirit language in Shepherd of Hermas, see online supplement.
sections reflect different theologies, remarking specifically on the devil, “Le mot διάβολος n’apparaît que dans les Préceptes [sic]. C’est peut-être qu’Hermas ne parle pas, ne sent pas le besoin de parler du diable ailleurs.”

Burke asserts that Hermas demythologised demons into “non-supernatural evil impulses.” Unquestionably Hermas has internalised demons, spirits and angels, but this does not necessarily entail demythologisation. By equating specific vices with evil spirits or demons, Hermas could be demythologising demons, or mythologising vices, or a little of both. Burke insists that it is strictly demythologisation, since “Hermas never describes exorcism as the means of dealing with these ‘spirits’” but instead prescribes a “non-supernatural remedy,” i.e. “repentance, faith, and moral self-renewal.” Indeed, he asserts that

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126 Robert Joly, “Hermas et le Pasteur,” VC 21 (1967): 214. Burke contrasts the view of repentance in Vis. 1–4 (presumably he means Vis. 2.2.4–5 specifically) with that in Mand. 3.3.1–7 (presumably he means 4.3.1–7) as another example of diachronic theological reversal, but some scholars regard these two passages as teaching the same idea, namely “the possibility of a second and final repentance” (David E. Aune, “Hermas”, in Encyclopedia of Early Christianity, 2d ed., ed. Everett Ferguson [New York: Routledge, 1999], 521; cf. Everett Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 238 n. 60).

127 One can agree with Burke and his sources that the two angels correspond to the good and evil inclinations of rabbinic theology, and represent a more internalised form of the Two Ways dualism found in 1QS and Barnabas. However, there is no contradiction between texts that stress the internality of the conflict and those that stress its externality: “it is not a question of different concepts or worldviews; all arise from an anthropological dualism that ascribes the experience of good and evil to external causality” (Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 123). Gokey, Terminology, 123, writes concerning Hermas’ two angels motif, “We are now face to face with the role of the devil in the psychology of sin.”

128 The third option seems safest, since “To try to distinguish sharply between allegorical figures, spirits, and angels is to do violence to the elusive nature of the imagery” (Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 34). Russell, Satan, 45, remarks, “Sometimes these spirits [in The Shepherd] seem to be taken literally...sometimes symbolically.”

129 Burke makes this argument in opposition to Graham H. Twelftree, In the Name
Hermas’ response to the demonic does not require “recourse to a third party exercising supernatural power.” Yet what is faith but “recourse to a third party exercising supernatural power” (cf. Mand. 9.12; 5.2.1)? Again, Burke claims that Hermas’ remedy for the demonic is “moral, rather than … spiritual.” Whence this antithesis, since Hermas teaches that moral behaviour (patience as opposed to anger) enables the holy spirit to dwell in a person, and wards off evil spirits (Mand. 5.1.1-4)?

A demythologised view of Hermas’ demon-vides seems intuitive in a 21st-century Western context, where the word “demons” is often so used (e.g., an alcoholic battles “his demons”). However, we should be wary of importing such notions back into Hermas’ Sitz im Leben, in which belief in spirits was prevalent. Further evidence that Hermas retained at least a partly mythological view of demons is his plainly mythological view of the devil—something Burke concedes. Hence, more plausible than a befuddled Hermas who demythologised demons but not the devil is a Hermas who projected social and moral struggles “into the cosmic realm, where divine and demonic power battle for control of human beings.”

**Martyrdom of Polycarp**

In his analysis of Martyrdom of Polycarp, Burke offers non-satanological interpretations of what are actually two clear references to Satan. The first is Mart. Pol. 2.4 (3.1) (“the devil devised many torments against them”), where ὁ διάβολος has been universally interpreted sa-

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130 “The world of Hermas is inhabited by many spirits, both good and evil … as was common in popular Greco-Roman and Jewish cosmology of the time” (Osiek, *Shepherd of Hermas*, 31, 33).

131 Burke suggests that “a case could be made” that Hermas demythologises the devil too, but wisely opts not to make this case—see online supplement for further comment.


134 The versification differs between sources. Following Burke, I will refer to this text as 2.4.
The second is Mart. Pol. 17.1, which mentions Ὁ \[\ldots\] ἀντίζηλος καὶ βάσκανος πονηρός, ὁ ἀντικείμενος τῷ γένει τῶν δικαίων ("the jealous and envious Evil One, the enemy of the race of the upright"). Here, the consensus for a satanological referent is overwhelming, though not unanimous.

Burke’s arguments for non-satanological referents of these terms are primarily text-critical. Having questioned the overall integrity of the textual tradition, which he claims is particularly problematic in 2.4 and 17.1, he boldly asserts that the textual problems “indicate that these passages have been subjected to modifications intended to alter the intended meaning of these terms [i.e., *ho ponēros* and *diabolos*] by changing their referents.” In short, Burke offers a textual conspiracy theory.

The first text-critical issue concerns the term ὁ τύραννος ("the tyrant") in the sentence preceding that containing ὁ διάβολος. The recent critical texts of Ehrman and Michael W. Holmes omit ὁ τύραννος, as does Paul Anthony Hartog’s recent essay. Burke argues

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135 See references in online supplement.
136 See references in online supplement.
138 Note, however, William R. Schoedel, “Polycarp of Smyrna and Ignatius of Antioch,” *ANRW* 2.27.1 (1993): 353, who observes that “although serious doubts have been entertained about the integrity of MartPol, critical opinion is now moving in the opposite direction,” and Ehrman, *Apostolic Fathers*, 1:361, who states that recent scholarship has tended to regard the book as “a unified whole, written at one time by one author” with the exception of the epilogue of chapter 22 and possibly 21.
139 The Christians were punished with various tortures, “ἵνα, εἰ δυνηθείη, [ὁ τύραννος] διὰ τῆς ἐπιμόνου κολάσεως εἰς ἄρνησιν αὐτῶν τρέψῃ. Πολλὰ γὰρ ἐμηχανάτο κατ’ αὐτῶν ὁ διάβολος.” This follows Ehrman’s text, but with [ὁ τύραννος] inserted for clarity.
141 Paul Anthony Hartog, “The Devil’s in the Details: The Apocalyptic ‘Adversary’ in
for its retention but underrepresents the external evidence for the shorter reading and offers an unconvincing interpretation of the internal evidence.\textsuperscript{142} Anyway, whether ὁ τύραννος is dropped or retained, ὁ διάβολος is still the devil and not, as Burke avers, the Roman proconsul.\textsuperscript{143}

Burke argues that the proconsul is the referent in 17.1 too, relying on dubious text-critical inferences\textsuperscript{144} and a syntactical error.\textsuperscript{145} He also

\textsuperscript{142} See further discussion of the text-critical problem in online supplement.

\textsuperscript{143} See note 78 above on the consistent satanological use of ὁ διάβολος in early Christian literature. Burke claims that “further evidence for [his interpretation] is the fact that ὁ διάβολος πονηρὸν ("the evil enemy") is used in 1 Macc 1:36 of the opponents of the Jews under Apollonius.” Actually, διάβολον πονηρὸν is anarthrous in 1 Macc 1:36, and refers specifically to the citadel of the city of David: “It was an ambush against the temple, and continually a wicked adversary against Israel” (Jonathan A. Goldstein, \textit{I Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary}, AB 41 [New York: Doubleday, 1976], 206). It thus does not closely parallel διάβολος in Mart. Pol. 2.4, which isarthrous and clearly refers to an individual person.

\textsuperscript{144} Burke notes strained syntax in 17.2b and textual uncertainties surrounding 17.2d–3 and argues that the source of the problem was “lack of clarity as to the role of the ‘evil one,’” leading to “confusion of subsequent copyists, and the consequent instability of the text.” However, apparently no scholars regard 17.1 as interpolated, notwithstanding long-standing debates over the authenticity of Mart. Pol. 17.2f. (with interpolations of varying size posited by Hans von Campenhausen, “Bearbeitungen und Interpolationen des Polykarpmartyriums,” in \textit{Aus der Frühzeit des Christentums, Studien zur Kirchengeschichte des ersten und zweiten Jahrhunderts} [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1957], 275–77; Schoedel, “Polycarp of Smyrna and Ignatius of Antioch,” 352; Boudewijn Dehandschutter, “The Martyrdom Polycarpi: A Century of Research,” \textit{ANRW} 2.27.1 [1993]: 497, and others). Gerd Buschmann, \textit{Das Martyrium des Polykarp: Übersetzung und Erklärung}, KAV 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 327, states, “So wird denn in der jüngeren Forschung die Authentizität von \textit{MartPol} 17f. nicht mehr bezweifelt.” Thus Burke’s lengthy discussion of the problems with 17.2–3 entirely misses the point. There are textual variants in v. 1, but none that cast doubt on the referent—see further comment in online supplement.

\textsuperscript{145} Burke incorrectly states that ὁ πονηρὸς in Mart. Pol. 17.1 could be translated “the evil” instead of “the evil one.” Ὁ πονηρὸς is unambiguously masculine; “the evil” as

makes much of Eusebius’ and Rufinus’ editing of this text in their histories, even though their redactions reduced the devil’s role in the story—precisely the opposite of what Burke’s hypothesis expects!\(^{146}\) With these largely irrelevant arguments aside, we can simply note compelling lexicographical\(^{147}\) and contextual\(^{148}\) evidence for a satanological subject in 17.1. Hartog argues persuasively that τὸν ἁδικὸν ἀρχοντα (“the unjust ruler”) in Mart. Pol. 19.2 is also Satan,\(^{149}\) leading him to conclude that “Throughout the narrative of Mart. Pol., the ultimate source of opposition is the Devil.”\(^{150}\) Far less convincing is Burke’s finding: a “remarkable” “paucity of satanological language in the Martyrdom of Polycarp.”

**Diognetus and Quadratus**

The *Epistle to Diognetus* is later than the other Apostolic Fathers texts (probably late second century) and is a composite work consisting of an apology (chapters 1–10) and a homily (chapters 11–12).\(^{151}\) Burke com-

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\(^{146}\) See further comment in online supplement.

\(^{147}\) On ὁ ἀντικείµενος, see note 72 above. Ὁ πονηρός is an even more common satanological designation, being clearly attested in Matt 13:19; Eph 6:16; 1 John 2:13–14; 5:18–19; Barn. 2.10; and possibly in Matt 5:37; 6:13; 13:38; John 17:15; 2 Thess 3:3; 1 John 3:12; Did. 8.2; Barn. 21.3 (for exegesis of the NT cases, see Farrar and Williams, “Diabolical Data,” 43–46). Gokey, *Terminology*, 97 n. 10, notes that βάσκανος “often occurs as a modifier of δαίµων on sepulchral inscriptions … and has common associations with magic.”

\(^{148}\) Burke overlooks language that could not possibly apply to a human being: “… having seen the greatness of Polycarp’s death as a martyr and the irreproachable way of life that he had from the beginning—and that he had received the crown of immortality and was awarded with the incontestable prize …” Which Roman official could have seen Polycarp’s way of life from the beginning (86 years in Christ’s service, according to Mart. Pol. 9.3)? How could a mortal have seen that Polycarp, after dying, had received the crown of immortality? For further contextual evidence from the *Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne*, see online supplement.

\(^{149}\) Hartog, “Devil’s in the Details,” 447–49; similarly, Buschmann, *Das Martyrium*, 352.

\(^{150}\) Hartog, “Devil’s in the Details,” 452.

ments that it “contains no satanological terminology.” This is almost certainly true of the apology (and unsurprising, since satanology would have meant little to a Greco-Roman addressee.) However, in the homily, δ ὁφις likely refers to Satan (“the one who thinks he knows anything apart from the knowledge that is true … is deceived by the serpent,” Diogn. 12.6, cf. 12.3, 8). Burke further claims that this author’s view of pagan gods was “completely contrary” to his Christian contemporaries, since he engages in polemic against idolatry “without any reference to demonic beings.” This AFS overlooks that the author explicitly says he is cutting his argument short (“I could say many other things about why Christians do not serve such gods,” Diogn. 2.10).

While acknowledging that “short fragments and incomplete texts…provide little material to analyze,” Burke attempts to analyse the Apology of Quadratus, calling it “remarkable” that Quadratus fails to mention Satan or demons in the extant fragment (a passage discussing Jesus’ healings) and seeing “signs of an Adamic etiology of sin and non-

152 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 160.

153 See Koskenniemi, “Unaware of His Schemes,” 120 (quoted above). Justin’s apologies (written for a Greco-Roman audience) mention Satan only once (I Apol. 28.1), compared with dozens of references in his Dialogue with Trypho. Thus an AFS in Diogn. 1–10 carries little weight—especially given the lacunae of unknown size at Diogn. 7.6 and 10.8 (on which see Ehrman, Apostolic Fathers, 2:124; Foster, “Diognetus,” 163; Clayton N. Jefford, The Epistle to Diognetus (with the Fragment of Quadratus): Introduction and Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 232).

154 Burke cites Russell, Satan, 46 n. 49, and Jefford, Epistle to Diognetus, 102, to the effect that δ ὁφις is not explicitly identified as Satan in this text. However, δ ὁφις is used as a stand-alone satanological designation already in Rev 12:15, and frequently by Justin in his Dialogue (which probably also predates Diognetus).

155 Gokey, Terminology, 118–19 n. 12 notes that while “the deceit of the serpent” in Diogn. 12.3 (referring to the events in Eden) does not suggest anything satanological, the present deceit by the serpent in 12.6 “would favour an active interpretation.” So too would the present immunity from the serpent’s touch in 12.8.

156 For commentary on this remark, see online supplement.

mythological etiology of illness,” although the text does not discuss aetiology at all. As mentioned earlier, that Burke mounts an AFS from a 49-word fragment fittingly captures his study’s heavy reliance on negative evidence.

**Barnabas and the Epistles of Ignatius**

Barnabas and the seven Epistles of Ignatius are the only Apostolic Fathers texts that Burke regards as reflecting strong belief in mythological evil. They do indeed, so only a few comments are necessary. Burke mistakenly states that in Barnabas “neither demons nor exorcism are mentioned.” Barnabas 16.7 states, “before we believed in God, the dwelling place of our heart … was full of idolatry and was a house of demons ...” Burke puzzlingly claims that Ignatius “makes no mention of demons,” only to quote a passage where Ignatius does exactly that (*Smyrn. 3.2; cf. 2.1*). Burke also overlooks other Ignatian references to

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159 Twelftree, *Name of Jesus*, 220, 285, also remarks on the fragment, but more cautiously: he “speculate[s]” that “miracles, including exorcism, were not important” in Quadratus’ church, while conceding that this “can only be an argument from silence.” He adds that while the fragment does not mention Jesus’ exorcisms, “the catch-all term ‘those ... cured’ (οἱ θεραπευθέντες) could be said to cover such healings.”
160 Burke, “Satan and Demons,” 156–59. Burke allows that the Satan figure of Pol. *Phil. 7.1 “possibly” implies belief in supernatural evil (127 n. 4).*
161 This writer’s notion of a human as an σῶς for demons parallels Matt 12:43–45; Luke 11:24–26. Burke also overlooks the reference to an evil angel (ἄγγελος πονηρός) in Barn. 9.4. James Carleton Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background*, WUNT 2/64 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 183, identifies this angel as the devil himself, but Russell, *Satan*, 39, n. 23, more plausibly interprets it as an unidentified angel since ἄγγελος is anarthrous.
162 In *Smyrn. 2.1*, Ignatius warns that those who deny a physical resurrection will, ironically, become δαιμονικοί (“like the demons”). In *Smyrn. 3.2*, Ignatius quotes an otherwise unknown post-resurrection dominical saying similar to Luke 24:39: “Reach out, touch me and see that I am not a bodiless demon (δαιμόνιον ἄσωματον).” Travis W. Proctor, “Bodiless Docetists and the Daimonic Jesus: Daimonological Discourse and Anti-Docetic Polemic in Ignatius’ Letter to the Smyrnaeans,” *Archiv für Religionsgeschichte* 14 (2013): 185, argues persuasively that these texts exhibit “an ‘apocalyptic’ daimonology, where daimons were understood as part of a pervasive
cosmological evil that evoke the Pauline “powers” language (cf. Ign. Rom. 5.3; Smyrn. 6.1; Trall. 5.1–2; possibly “aeons” in Ign. Eph. 19.2\textsuperscript{163}). Furthermore, attempting to draw a sharp theological contrast between these two authors and the other Apostolic Fathers, Burke emphasises that “this satan is the primary explanatory recourse for Barnabas’ etiology of evil and sin” and stresses Ignatius’ “consistent use of the devil as an explanation for all forms of evil and wrongdoing.” Burke overlooks that these two authors also express what he would call an anthropogenic aetiology of evil and non-supernatural remedies for evil.\textsuperscript{164} This again illustrates the fallaciousness of the dichotomies on which Burke’s methodology rests.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Space does not allow evaluation of Burke’s claims regarding the “theological innovation” in the later second century in the area of satanology and demonology. Broadly speaking, these “innovations” would be better described as systematisations of earlier Christian ideas about evil.

The findings of this study are as follows. Contra Burke, 1 Clement, 2 Clement, Shepherd of Hermas and Martyrdom of Polycarp all undoubtedly reflect belief in Satan (despite mentioning this concept with varying frequency). Diognetus probably does too, and the Didache may. Once Burke’s tendentious interpretations of the satanological terminology in these texts are set aside, it becomes apparent that his AFS concerning their authors’ non-belief in Satan are built on a very noisy silence! The Apostolic Fathers mention demons only sporadically and exorcism never, but none of these texts meets Lange’s second condition for a conclusive AFS for its author’s non-belief in demons. Broadly speaking, the Apostolic Fathers, like the NT writers, reflect theologies of onslaught of evil powers” whose origin was rooted in the Watchers myth.

\textsuperscript{163} So Schoedel, \textit{Ignatius}, 91 n. 24.

\textsuperscript{164} For supporting evidence, see online supplement.
evil that incorporate both anthropological and cosmological elements. Burke’s study, while offering some insights and stimulating further research, suffers from major methodological shortcomings and exegetical errors. Its minimalistic bias with respect to mythological evil appears on every page, reconfirming Michael Becker’s observation:

[T]he reason for the lack of interest [in evil and of figures representing evil] lies not so much in the scarcity of references as in the theological presuppositions of modern exegesis in general.165